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International Legal Theory
Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. By Stephen D. Krasner. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1999. Pp. 264. Price: $16.95 (Paperback).
Reviewed by Lars Kirchhoff.
The word "sovereignty" captures within its intellectual history the
developments of several centuries. The quest for sovereignty has changed
national and international landscapes and, at times, has allowed rulers to hide
substantial atrocities behind its mask. The expression has also led to a good
deal of academic confusion. In his latest book, Stephen D. Krasner, professor
of international relations at Stanford University, argues that considerable parts
of the discussion on sovereignty are out of touch with historical reality.
Krasner begins his analysis by distinguishing four forms of sovereignty.
These forms-domestic, interdependent, international legal, and
Westphalian-are neither logically coupled, nor have they cohered in practice.
The primary focus of Krasner's study is to deal with the persistent
discrepancies between Westphalian sovereignty (referring to political
organization based on the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority
structures) and international legal sovereignty (the principle that international
recognition should be accorded only to juridically independent territorial
entities).
Krasner disentangles the complex relationship between these concepts.
The international legal sovereignty of a state says little about the existence vel
non of its Westphalian sovereignty because international recognition has not
kept rulers from attempts to alter domestic authority structures, policies, or
even personnel of other states. State autonomy has clashed with competing
principles and disparate interests in an environment of asymmetrical power,
allowing strong rulers to follow a logic of expected consequences rather than a
logic of appropriateness. Accordingly, Krasner argues, powerful states have
been unlikely to lose Westphalian sovereignty, unless by means of
conventions or contractual arrangements, whereas weaker states have
constantly been targets of intervention through coercion or imposition.
Observers have been blinded to this by the lip service of elites to the sanctity
of sovereignty. Illustrating the proportions of his thesis, Krasner goes so far as
to say that arguably half of the countries of Europe have never enjoyed
Westphalian sovereignty for a single moment of their existence as
international legal sovereigns.
In constructing the analytical framework to prove his thesis, Krasner
investigates the appropriateness of diverse theories of institutions and
international politics. He states that none of the best-known approaches to
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institutions provides an adequate understanding of Westphalian or
international legal sovereignty. Instead, both are better described as organized
hypocrisy, the presence of long-standing norms that are frequently violated.
Krasner sees hypocrisy, frequent in domestic political settings, to be even
more prevalent in the international environment, where rulers rhetorically
accept Westphalian principles and at the same time endorse contradictory
norms. Subsequently, Krasner considers a whole spectrum of fields in which
the Westphalian model, although rhetorically invoked, provides limited
understanding of actual practice.
The following chapters deal with minority rights and human rights,
which Krasner sees as two different incarnations of a coherent international
concern. Accordingly, he considers the perception of human rights as a recent,
revolutionary development as historically misleading, disregarding the extent
to which international actors constantly directed their attention to the relations
between rulers and ruled. The major peace treaties of the last four centuries-
Westphalia, Vienna, Versailles-as well as the Peace of Paris and the Dayton
Accords all included provisions related to minority rights.
The method of coercion most commonly used has been to make new
states' international recognition dependent on their acceptance of minority
rights. Krasner uncovers a double standard: Due to power asymmetries,
victors could impose their views on rulers or would-be rulers of weaker states
while accepting no provisions for the protection of minorities within their own
societies, such as the Welsh and Irish in Britain, or Blacks and Asians in the
United States. Krasner rediscovers the same pattern when analyzing minority
issues in the 1990s: The end of the Cold War, accompanied by and sometimes
causing a renewal of ethnic strife, led the European Community to explicitly
include adherence to minority rights in the conditions for recognition of the
successor states of Yugoslavia. The consistency with which the same
agreements endorse principles resonant of Westphalian sovereignty illustrates
Krasner's central idea of organized hypocrisy: mutually inconsistent
principles along with imperfect implementation.
The book then addresses the interrelation between sovereignty and the
human rights movement. Whereas no human rights accord violates
international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty can be compromised
by the creation of authoritative supranational institutions or the purposeful
alteration of conceptions of legitimate behavior. Further complicating the
analysis, a number of human rights conventions have been endorsed not
because rulers had the intention or even the ability to implement their
precepts, but because such agreements were part of a cognitive script that
defined appropriate behavior for a modem state in the late twentieth century.
Again, in this respect, words and deeds have been decoupled.
The next focus lies on sovereign lending as another form of violating the
Westphalian norm. Due to a traditionally high default -rate in repayment of
international loans, the lenders' motivational pattern cannot be explained by
the prospect of an economically secure enterprise. Instead, the borrowers,
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attracted by the loan, violate their own domestic autonomy by inviting lenders
to exercise authority over fiscal or other activities within their own borders,
eventually leading to direct changes in policies, personnel, or institutions.
Thus, lending to a sovereign becomes a vehicle through which the domestic
autonomy of weaker polities is compromised. Although this mechanism was
already operative throughout the nineteenth century, Krasner considers its
modem protagonists to be the International Financial Institutions (IFIs),
initiated by the creation of the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund. Despite the principle that the respective charters of the IFIs generally
prohibit political conditionality, Krasner empirically supports his assumption
that they are becoming more expansive about conditions accompanying their
loans. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, with states in need no longer
able to play off West against East, violations of domestic policies and thereby
of Westphalian principles have become more apparent and intrusive.
The final chapters denote a shift to the question as to what extent
constitutional structures of states created in the nineteenth and twentieth
century have been subject to external authority. Krasner contrasts two
scenarios: the Western Hemisphere as opposed to the Balkans in the
nineteenth century, and the successor states of the European empires as
opposed to Eastern and Western Europe in the course of the twentieth century.
States that secured their independence from Britain, Spain, France, and
Portugal at the end of the eighteenth and the first part of the nineteenth
century, Krasner argues, possessed Westphalian as well as international legal
sovereignty until the United States created its sphere of influence. In the
Balkans, however, developments constantly were at variance with the
Westphalian model because the power and manifest interests of the major
states in Europe provoked them to acts of intervention.
In the twentieth century, postcolonial developments in the British and
French successor states, which had only limited economic and strategic value,
generally conformed with the Westphalian model; domestic regime structures
that emerged out of European colonial empires in Asia and Africa were
largely the result of indigenous decisions. In contrast, violations of autonomy
were extensive in Europe, especially after the Second World War, when the
United States and the Soviet Union were determined to reproduce their
preferred political structures in the states within their respective spheres of
influence. Krasner highlights the difference in methods employed. The United
States primarily sought to influence through contracts and the support of
actors whose preferences were complementary to their own. The Soviet
Union's way of penetrating the domestic polities of the satellite states,
eminently illustrated by the Brezhnev Doctrine, was characterized by
imposition or coercion. Krasner points out that, in a Westphalian world,
powerful rulers, instead of finding ways to influence the domestic structures
of target states, would have tried to change their respective foreign policies. In
an anarchic system, however, nothing-in particular, no notion of
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sovereignty-prevented powerful states from embracing more intrusive
strategies.
In a concluding remark, Krasner states that the international system is
"not like a game of chess" (p. 237): Its constitutive rules never exclude
alternatives. Granting international legal sovereignty and at the same time
violating the Westphalian sovereignty of the weaker state has allowed the
powerful states to follow their interests without at the same time bearing the
direct costs of governance; therefore, it has been more attractive than other
institutional options. Krasner's thesis clearly contradicts the idea that the
recent process of globalization has been responsible for systematically
undermining state sovereignty. As Krasner sees it, rulers have always operated
in a transnational environment, and there has never been some ideal time
when most political entities conformed with all the characteristics associated
with sovereignty.
The attempt to expose the patent discrepancy between words and deeds
in the domain of history and international relations is not new. Neither is the
observation that power in the form of economic wealth, effective enforcement
mechanisms, or sheer force of arms has always played a decisive role in
dividing lip service from reality. Depending on the discipline and perspective
of the scholar, this phenomenon has been referred to as the persistent gap
between norm-formulation and implementation, between the myth system and
the operational code, or between official and quiet diplomacy. The question
remains whether a world more openly dealing with its actual power structure
would be more peaceful.
What is innovative about Krasner's approach is the ruthless and
convincing analysis of a whole spectrum of mechanisms of intervention made
use of by the major powers throughout history. His construct of ideas is
coherent and sharp-minded, and the illustrations are so numerous and
comprehensive that they leave little room for the criticism of selection bias.
After the extensive definition and presentation of the basic argument in the
first chapter, however, the considerable amount of repetitive definitions and
references to his initial thesis throughout the book are not necessary to make
the argument.
The static understanding of the notion of "Westphalian" sovereignty
deserves more explanation. Interpreting complex political events that occurred
over several centuries necessitates proceeding in a non-mechanical fashion,
even with regard to the conceptional framework employed. Sovereignty is a
relative concept in international affairs that has changed immensely through
time. Envisaging the shift of international concern from the rulers to the ruled,
and reflecting on alternative conceptions in the sense of the people's
sovereignty rather than the sovereign s sovereignty would not only affect what
Krasner calls "domestic" sovereignty, but also his central topic of
Westphalian sovereignty. Monitoring the transformation and election
processes in states of the former Eastern Bloc, as well as preventing a despot
from the unrestricted exercise of his personal perception of national
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sovereignty, might be labeled as an intervention. It can, however, be the
framework for an unfolding of the domestic authority structure in its truest
sense.
Krasner's book inspires a critical rethinking of historical events and their
scientific classification. It will not fail to provide the academic discussion of
sovereignty with new impetus.
Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law. By Brad R. Roth. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. xxx, 439. Price: $115.00
(Hardcover). Reviewed by Chimne Keitner.
Brad R. Roth's Governmental illegitimacy in International Law probes
the principles and practices underlying the collective non-recognition of
governments. Set against the backdrop of contemporary affirmations of an
"emerging right to democratic governance" and even "the end of history," this
study cautions against the premature proclamation of the demise of
substantive ideological pluralism in the international realr. It focuses on the
process by which the international community accepts a given government as
the legitimate and authoritative agent of a sovereign people, embodied in a
state. Through a discussion of political theory, international treaties, and an
impressive array of historical case studies of U.N. practice from its origins to
the present day, Roth concludes that recent decades have indeed witnessed an
increased (though far from consistent) emphasis on internal factors as valid
considerations in granting or withholding external recognition of a
government's legitimacy, though not nearly to the degree that some scholars
suggest. Furthermore, Roth affirms that the endurance of diverse
governmental systems and standards should in fact reassure, not disturb, those
genuinely committed to the principles of sovereignty and self-determination-
and even those committed to the idea of democracy itself.
As a work of international legal scholarship, Roth's analysis is relatively
insulated from the "power-political" concerns that may in fact guide many, if
not most, decisions about whether or not to accord international recognition to
a putative government. His central concern is recognition in the "legal," not
the "political" sense: that is, a collective decision on the part of the
international community to act as though a particular government is or is not
the "true" voice of the sovereign people it claims to represent. Roth
acknowledges that "[r]ecognition and non-recognition continue to be spoken
of as political acts within the sovereign discretion of individual states, and a
regime's legal capacity to assert rights, incur obligations and authorize acts on
behalf of a state is subject to no systematic process of authoritative
determination" (p. 253). However, unless some sort of collective decision
manifests itself as to whether or not to treat a given government as a bona fide
international actor, the international legal order will have little if any
coherence. As such, Roth undertakes to identify the criteria which have in fact
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been used as the basis for granting or withholding recognition as a matter of
positive international law. The apparent lack of consistent standards leads
Roth to discredit the current trend of liberal-democratic wishful thinking, but
it does not preclude him from exploring the normative and aspirational
implications of the idea of democratic legitimacy and its connection to a more
pervasive and enduring emphasis on popular sovereignty as the basis for state
governments.
It has frequently been observed that the dual notions of sovereignty and
inviolability (leading to the principle of non-intervention) stand in tension
with ideals of self-determination and a more recent emphasis on individual
human rights. Roth brackets the question of secession and focuses instead on
what to do when the government of a given state is either installed
undemocratically (through a coup or other such usurpation) or contested (in
the case of rival factions or belligerency). As a general rule, the test of
"effective control" has been upheld as the dominant standard, both for
pragmatic and, Roth suggests, moral reasons. On the pragmatic level, it is
fairly clear that interstate relations depend upon the ability of a government to
secure compliance at the domestic level in order to follow through on its
international commitments. Indeed, two of the core criteria for statehood as
enumerated in the 1933 Montevideo Convention are (1) a government and (2)
the capacity to enter into relations with other states. While Roth reminds us
that "[t]he government does not define the state any more than the tail wags
the dog" (p. 132), part of what it is to be recognizable as a dog is to have a
tail. The pragmatic justification for the "effective control" standard relies on
this functional requirement.
The moral justification, on the other hand, opens the crack through
which theories of democratic legitimacy begin to seep-and the possibility for
external intervention to enforce a democratic standard along with them.
According to this logic, effective control operates as the best evidence that the
government is in fact representative of the popular will because a government
can only exert control over a people that has developed habits of obedience
and acquiescence that serve as negative proof of its support. As the study
progresses both chronologically and thematically, the importance of this
second justification comes to overshadow that of the first. The U.N.-
authorized intervention in Haiti to restore the popularly-elected but
subsequently ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide offers the paradigm case
for this kind of argument and its implications, which Roth highlights in the
introduction and analyzes in the final chapter of his book. He devotes the
intervening 400 pages to a philosophical and historical journey through
political theory and international practice to trace the contours of the idea of
an international norm of domestic democratic governance, ultimately
concluding that there cannot be much substance to such a standard in a world
still populated by so many diverse systems, including authoritarian and even
dictatorial regimes.
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This does not mean that no standards for the legitimacy of domestic
governments exist. At particular moments, international consensus has
emerged, most notably in condemnation of the apartheid regime in South
Africa in the early 1980s. Yet, even then, the United States and the United
Kingdom (in the unusual position of highlighting hypocrisy) voiced their
discomfort with holding one government to the standards of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights while ignoring violations on the part of others.
As long as dissensus persists on such matters, the international system is
unlikely to witness substantive normative change beyond what it has already
experienced. This observation constitutes the crux of Roth's corrective to the
proclamation of the impending triumph of liberal democracy worldwide. But
the question of when and why such moments of consensus may occur remains
understudied. In order to make analytic progress on this issue, Roth would
ultimately have to examine the domestic and international political interests of
the recognizing states to account for the apparent inconsistencies and double
standards that a principled international legal theory of recognition, even if
one did exist, probably still could not explain.
Comparative Studies
Blood Feuds: AIDS, Blood, and the Politics of Medical Disaster. Edited by
Eric A. Feldman and Ronald Bayer. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1999. Pp. xiii, 375. Price: $29.95 (Paperback). Reviewed by
Tammany Kramer.
In June 1981, the first case of AIDS was documented in the United
States. In July 1982, the Center for Disease Control reported that three
hemophiliacs had died of AIDS, a prelude to the high HIV-infection rate
within the hemophiliac population. In Blood Feuds, Eric A. Feldman and
Ronald Bayer have put together a collection of essays that looks at the AIDS
epidemic from the perspective of the hemophiliac population. The essays in
this book examine the ways in which health, economic, political, social,
moral, and legal elements of this tragedy play out across a variety of nations.
What is interesting about this volume is the way that recurring themes emerge
from the various descriptions of how different nations handled this crisis.
What is equally interesting are the concomitant large and small differences
between countries, accounted for by a variety of factors such as the political
climate, the ability of hemophiliacs to form an effective community, and the
specific structures of the blood collection/distribution systems.
The book opens with a useful introduction by the editors, who sketch out
some key questions and factors that drive the investigation into how HIV and
AIDS impacted the hemophiliac community and what resulted. The rest of the
book is divided into two sections. Part I, "National Encounters with Blood and
AIDS," constitutes the bulk of the volume and surveys the impact of and
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response to HIV/AIDS in a range of countries: the United States, Japan,
France, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, and Australia.
The writers in this collection examine several key problems. The
shortcomings of national blood systems, with respect to whole blood and
blood products, and their slow responses led to greater HIV-infection rates
than would have resulted with quicker action. This sluggishness stemmed
from institutional stagnation, competition between economic and health
system interests, political dynamics, and, on occasion, division within the
hemophiliac community. One effect of this tragedy was the shift from
conceptualizing blood donations as a "gift of life" to a more
commercial/manufacturing understanding of the blood supply system. Once
safety measures were in place by mid-1985--carefully screening donors and
heat-treating blood to eliminate the risk of HIV contamination-the future
blood supply was secured, but the vast number of hemophiliacs and
transfusion recipients who were already infected were left to deal with the
consequences.
Hemophiliac activism grew in force during the late 1980s and 1990s,
shifting the narrative from one of inevitability and tragedy to one of blame
and accountability. In addition to lobbying governments for compensation
packages, hemophiliacs looked to the legal system for redress by bringing
civil suits as well as petitioning for criminal trials. (In France, this last method
was particularly successful, resulting in blood officials being sent to prison.)
Actions were brought against responsible politicians, pharmaceutical
companies, blood banks, doctors, hospitals, and health system officials,
generating important questions. Were these cases of medical malpractice or
product liability? Why should compensation be limited to the hemophiliac
community? What role did hindsight play in the accusations launched against
various parties? At what point should blood system officials have acted?
In all nations, those infected sought apologies, acknowledgment of
culpability by those responsible, and financial compensation. However, the
burden of proof was often heavy: Information was sketchy at the time that
many hemophiliacs and transfusion recipients were infected, tracing infection
to specific treatment dates and products was impossible, and negligence was
difficult to establish. Thus, in a number of countries, legal recourse proved
less than satisfactory. In Italy, for example, there were few lawsuits because
of structural difficulties with the Italian legal system. Often there was a
tension between lobbying for governmental responsibility and compensation
on the one hand and litigation of the matter in court on the other. While all
countries eventually came to offer hemophiliacs compensation packages, most
governments predicated these on an understanding that the compensation
packages were humanitarian aid, not a concession of culpability. In some
instances, this compensation required waiving the right to sue. Some countries
managed to distribute liability costs among the government, insurance funds,
and pharmaceutical companies. Umberto Izzo reports that Italy took years to
disburse the promised compensation, the treasury bearing the sole burden.
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Many of the authors raise questions about cost-benefit analysis and what
relation that has to social concerns about health safety.
In some instances hemophiliacs successfully used the media in savvy
ways. Erik Albaek describes what happened in Denmark, where extreme
media criticism, fueled by political animus, targeted the Interior Minister
(labeling her "Blood Britta"). He notes that the Danish Hemophiliac Society
shrewdly framed the plight of hemophiliacs as living proof of the danger for
the entire population, thus garnering public sympathy and support.
However, this strategy of alliance had its flip side. Attempts to draw the
highly problematic distinction between "innocent" victims of }IV infection
and other groups (such as gays and intravenous drug users) created political
and cultural tensions. Another divisive conflict that arose, perhaps even more
important, was the one between doctors and patients. While patients had
trusted and depended on the medical community, this same community
betrayed them and put them in harm's way. The United States, in particular, as
the largest supplier of blood products and therefore of initial HIV-infected
blood, bears a heavy burden of responsibility. Nationalism factored heavily
into these events as well-the notion of "ours" and "theirs," the heightened
desirability of a self-sufficient blood supply.
Japan provides a paradigmatic example. Feldman spends a large portion
of his chapter on Japan tracing out the path of the litigation against the
Ministry of Health and Welfare and the five pharmaceutical companies
involved in supplying Japan with blood products. The parties eventually
reached a settlement, with apologies and acknowledgments made by key
players, and several arrests were also made. However, as Feldman points out,
the structural change necessary is probably not forthcoming, as the rhetoric
tended to focus on the impurity of "foreign blood," an ideological rather than
a pragmatic approach.
Part II of Blood Feuds, "Comparative Perspectives on the Politics of
Medical Disaster," contains a trio of essays. Dorothy Nelkin writes on the
cultural perspectives of blood, its symbolism and significance in a variety of
contexts. David Kirp's essay offers an extremely interesting examination of
the relationship between the gay and hemophiliac communities and the
similarities and differences in their activism. He points to the importance of
identity formation for hemophiliac activism. Sherry Glied, in the final chapter,
and Theodore R. Marmor, Patricia A. Dillon, and Stephen Scher, in the
Conclusion, pull together information from across the various countries and
summarize some of the conceptual and factual information to form an overall
picture. Indeed, readers looking only for a broad overview may consider
reading just the Introduction, Part II, and the Conclusion of this volume,
particularly since there is some small degree of repetition among the chapters
due to the similarities in the series of events being described. Alternatively,
those readers who want a more detailed, in-depth discussion of the way these
events played out in particular arenas should look to the essays in Part I as
well. This collection will appeal to a wide range of readers whose interests
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include law, public policy, health systems, social movements, patient
advocacy, hemophilia, and HIV. The thoughtful examination of the ways
these threads intersect and coalesce makes this volume provocative and
valuable.
Comparative Constitutional Law. Edited by Vicki C. Jackson and Mark
Tushnet. New York: Foundation Press, 1999. Pp. xiii, 1507. Price:
$60.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by David Fontana.
In denying petitions for writs of certiorari in Knight v. Florida and
Moore v. Nebraska, the U.S. Supreme Court on November 8, 1999, engaged
in what is sure to be an ongoing debate about the relevance of constitutional
traditions in other countries to American constitutional jurisprudence. The
petitions for certiorari dealt with the contention that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the execution of prisoners who have spent an inordinate amount of
time on death row. Justice Stephen Breyer, dissenting from the denial of
certiorari, cited the constitutional experiences of Jamaica, India, Zimbabwe,
the European Court of Human Rights, and Canada in support of the notion
that unduly long delays following conviction may invalidate a death sentence.
Concurring in the denial of certiorari, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that a
glance abroad was only used because there is no "such support in our own
jurisprudence" for the petitioners' arguments about the Eighth Amendment.
This episode is only the latest in a series of events which mark the onset
of a new American interest in the constitutional regimes of other countries
around the world. This comparativist spirit finds its place in Vicki C. Jackson
and Mark Tushnet's masterful new textbook, Comparative Constitutional
Law. Jackson, a Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, and
Tushnet, the Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law at
Georgetown University Law Center, use their background as observers of the
American constitutional scene to provide a rich new perspective on the study
of comparative constitutional law.
Jackson and Tushnet's book can be divided up into two main sections.
The first consists of Chapters I-V and deals with some of the theoretical
issues facing comparative constitutional law as a distinctive area of legal
scholarship. Jackson and Tushnet begin the book with an interesting
comparison of abortion decisions from the United States, Canada, and
Germany, and they use this area of doctrine as an introduction to the main
themes of comparative constitutional scholarship. Chapter II addresses the
issues of the utility and permissibility of constitutional borrowing. Jackson
and Tushnet present excerpts from a wide range of texts, from law review
articles to U.S. Supreme Court decisions to decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights. Chapters III, IV, and V all delve into more general issues of
constitutionalism, looking at writings and cases on constitutional change and
the concept of a written constitution.
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The second main part of the book deals with a more doctrine-oriented
comparison of Western-style constitutional regimes. Particularly insightful is
the initial discussion of the role that "foundational cases" from different
countries have played in shaping later legal doctrine and a rule-of-law culture.
Jackson and Tushnet discuss Germany's Southwest Case, France's 1971
Decision on Associations, a series of decisions from Israel, and Hungarian and
South African decisions on the death penalty. After this introduction to the
second part of the book, Jackson and Tushnet discuss the different approaches
adopted by countries with regard to justiciability, separation of powers,
federalism, pluralism, religious freedom, freedom of expression and
association, and social welfare rights. The mix of law review articles and
cases from national and supranational bodies provides a helpful commentary
on the issues.
The most original contribution in the book, however, lies in the more
theoretical first section. Jackson and Tushnet are not the first to address
comparative constitutional doctrine. Indeed, in the late 1970s two helpful
casebooks--one by Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, and another by
Mauro Cappelletti and William Cohen-provided a broad analysis of
comparative constitutional doctrine. The latter section of the Jackson and
Tushnet book merely updates and supplements these earlier casebooks. The
first section, however, heads into new academic territory. Jackson and
Tushnet provide a theoretical agenda for comparative constitutionalists,
presenting the two main theoretical issues that address the discipline: Are
constitutional borrowings helpful, and are they permissible?
The casebook excerpts debates between Justices Antonin Scalia and
Breyer in Stanford v. Kentucky, a 1989 death penalty case, and the recent
Printz v. United States, a 1997 case dealing with federalism. Justice Scalia
argues for what Jackson and Tushnet term a version of "American
exceptionalism": "Such comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of
interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of
writing one" (p. 168). Justice Breyer, clearly the Court's leading
"comparativist," argues that the experience of other countries may "cast an
empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal
problem" (p. 168). This fascinating dialogue, and a wealth of scholarly
literature addressing the same general issue, provides a welcome addition to
the past, purely doctrine-oriented comparative constitutional law casebooks.
The sole problems with the Jackson and Tushnet book are really inherent
in the nature of the enterprise. Any examination of constitutional systems of
the world must leave out some systems and issues. The casebook could be
further enhanced by the inclusion of even more discussion of non-Western
constitutional regimes. These other countries could at least provide an
intellectual contrast to the solutions adopted by countries that Jackson and
Tushnet do discuss. For instance, how do Islamic countries deal with religious
liberty? How do countries in Asia and Latin America deal with affirmative
action and other programs of economic inclusion? As the authors themselves
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admit, the book would benefit from discussion of "constitutionalism and
Islamic cultures, and... constitutional developments in Latin America, Asia
and Africa" (p. ix).
This textbook will clearly serve as the foundational text for the
emergence of comparative constitutional law as a distinctively new and rich
discipline within legal academia. Its discussion of constitutional doctrine from
abroad is thoroughly up to date and provides a solid basis to help understand
different approaches to common constitutional issues facing countries around
the world. The theoretical chapters provide an interesting point of departure
for legal comparativists, or indeed anyone interested in "borrowing" the
insights of one country and applying them to the dilemmas facing another
country. The book serves a vital purpose both for those interested in the
domestic debate about the uses of comparative constitutionalism and for those
who seek to better appreciate the emergence of sophisticated and insightful
constitutional regimes around the world.
Legal History
Roman Law in European History. By Peter Stein. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999. Pp. ix, 137. Price: $18.95 (Paperback).
Reviewed by John A. Houlihan.
More than fifty years after its publication, Paul Koschaker's Europa und
das r6mische Recht remains the definitive work on its subject, and, as Peter
Stein notes in his introduction to Roman Law in European History, "[t]his
book does not purport to rival that of Koschaker" (p. 2). However, for the
non-specialist reader who seeks a succinct and accurate introduction to the
long and complex history of Roman law in Europe, Stein's book is invaluable.
Originally published in German in 1996 under the title R6misches Recht und
Europa, this English version will satisfy an especially great need for readers
to whom Koschaker's German is inaccessible.
Stein, the Emeritus Regius Professor of Civil Law at Cambridge
University, divides his subject chronologically into four chapters, which
follow a brief introduction designated as Chapter 1. Chapter 2 covers Roman
law from its beginnings through Justinian's codification. Stein's account of
the origins of Roman law is the traditional one: The Twelve Tables, modeled
on Solon's Athenian law code, were promulgated in 451 B.C. in response to
plebeian demands for a written law as a check on patrician magistrates. In 367
B.C., the story goes, the office of praetor was established to administer justice
more efficiently. If the praetor found that a remedy existed for the claim
before him, he would set out the issue in hypothetical terms known as a
formula; the facts of the case would then be tried by a single juryman, the
iudex. (Stein notes the familiar comparison to the English system of writs.)
Each year, the newly-elected praetor would issue an edict detailing the
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circumstances in which a formula would be granted. As Roman society
became more complex, praetors and iudices, as well as litigants, came to rely
on the opinions of legal experts known as jurists. The juristic tradition
flourished under the early Empire, but waned in the third century A.D.
Judices, by then professional judges who would decide both law and facts,
simply counted the opinions of earlier jurists and ruled with the majority view.
In the sixth century, the Eastern Emperor Justinian revived legal
scholarship by publishing a Digest of excerpts from the opinions of the jurists,
a new Code of imperial legislation, and a legal text-book known as the
Institutes: together, the Corpus luris Civilis. The Digest did not come to
Western Europe's attention until the eleventh century. Once it did, however,
its influence was profound, as Stein describes in Chapter 3. Bologna became a
center of legal scholarship, and the scholar Accursius's glosses on the Digest
came to be regarded as more authoritative than the Digest itself. By the
fourteenth century, canon law had been compiled into a body comparable to
Justinian's compilation of the civil law, and canon and civil law together
formed a ius commune taught at universities throughout Europe. The extent to
which courts applied this ius commune, as opposed to local customary law,
varied from country to country; in England, Stein notes, custom was
particularly strong.
The fourteenth century also saw the rise of a new generation of
commentators on the civil law; the most famous of these was Bartolus, whose
commentaries were more practically oriented than the work of the earlier
glossators had been. Chapter 4 traces Bartolus's efforts and those of the
Renaissance humanists, who were chiefly interested in "recovering the true
Roman law from the obfuscations of the glossators and Commentators" (p.
78). In doing so, however, the humanists weakened the authority of Roman
law by pointing out that it was designed for a very different world from that in
which they were living. Meanwhile, in France, local customary law was put in
written form; this meant that there was relatively little use for Roman law in
French courts. The same was true of English common-law courts, but less true
for the Court of Chancery. In German courts, which were run by laymen, the
practice arose of seeking advice from the law faculty of the local university.
These professors generally applied Roman law. Moreover, the Holy Roman
Empire saw Roman law as a means of unifying the disparate German states. In
the Netherlands, the influence of Roman law was so great that the country's
law became known as "Roman-Dutch."
In the seventeenth century, the Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius applied
Roman legal principles to international and natural law, as did Samuel
Pufendorf, though with a more explicitly Christian emphasis. Pufendorf's
work is described in Stein's last chapter, as are eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century attempts, under the influence of Montesquieu, to rationalize and
codify the laws of various states. The most significant of these was the French
Code civil, issued by Napoleon in 1804 and still in force (though much
amended); it sought to combine the best elements of both Roman and
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customary law. In Germany, debate between "Romanists" and "Germanists"
delayed the adoption of a code until 1900. In England, the study of Roman
law had less direct influence; it crept occasionally into the case law, but its
larger impact was on historical and anthropological scholarship such as that of
Sir Henry Maine. In the twentieth century, the humanist emphasis on textual
criticism and ancient legal studies has predominated. This has led to a
widening schism between scholars of Roman law and those of modem civil
law. Stein hints that the beginning of a new ius commune in the European
Union may help to bridge this gap.
Stein's book is concise and easily accessible to the general reader; that is
its great virtue, but it is not without its costs. Some of Stein's assertions are
open to question and demand more explanation than the book's scope affords:
For example, his claim that the views of the Spanish neo-Scholastics had
"very little effect on the actual practice of the colonists in the New World" (p.
95) is an oversimplification at best. There are no footnotes, but each chapter is
followed by well-chosen suggestions for further reading. Within its
constraints, Roman Law in European History is a succinct and elegant
retelling of a complicated tale, and a work for which English-speaking readers
will be grateful.
Foundations of World Order: The Legalist Approach to International
Relations, 1898-1922. By Francis Anthony Boyle. Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1999. Pp. ix, 220. Price: $18.95 (Paperback). Reviewed by
Philip Chen. •
One of the most discussed debates in the study of international affairs
has been that between international lawyers and scholars of international
relations. The latter criticize the former for paying too little attention to the
basic concepts of power and security, while the former, in return, suggest that
the latter are insensitive to notions of norms and justice. The historical
battlegrounds for this debate have been the major international crises of our
time-the two world wars and the Cold War.
The pre-World War I generation of international lawyers, which is the
focus of Foundations of World Order, has most often been the target of attack
by realists of international affairs. The prominent lawyers of that era who held
leading foreign policy positions have frequently stood accused of naively
relying upon unenforceable international law, rather than power and
deterrence, to police the actions of powerful, predatory states. The critique
suggests that the institutional legacies of this generation-the League of
Nations and the World Court, to name only two-raised false hopes and
ultimately planted the seeds of the Second World War.
Francis Anthony Boyle, a professor of international law at the University
of Illinois, aims to blunt this critique through a chronological discussion of
early twentieth-century American attempts to inject notions of international
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law into the practice of international relations. He describes the early U.S.
legalists not as starry-eyed, naive diplomats but as savvy, hard-nosed men,
such as Elihu Root, who made their mark in the worlds of both law and
politics. They were aware of the Austinian, legal positivist critique of
international affairs and the limits of international law. Moreover, they were
men who did not shy away from the use of military force, and they routinely
applied it in regions such as Latin America and East Asia. Rather, Boyle
suggests, this generation of international lawyers developed a sophisticated,
realistic approach to regulating international conflict, which eventually
formed the foundation of the international legal system we have today.
The heart of the "legalist approach," according to Boyle, was the notion
that power politics could be contained through an ever-expanding set of legal
institutions, which states would join in order to receive the benefits of
interstate cooperation. Failure to observe the rules of the international society
would be policed by some notion of public opinion, as well as ostracism from
the system by other states. The fundamental struts for this conception of world
order were (1) mandatory international arbitration; (2) establishment of an
International Court of Justice; (3) continued codification of international law;
(4) creation of treaty regimes to limit arms; and (5) institutionalization of
international peace conferences to resolve disputes.
In the minds of this generation of American international lawyers, the
components worked together to promote stability. International arbitration
helped de-politicize conflict and provided mechanisms through which
compromises could be worked out. American international lawyers advocated
the codification of customary international law because they believed that
codification would make states more willing to bring their cases before
judicial tribunals. These processes would eventually lead to arms reduction, as
states realized that their security was not as threatened as before. This virtuous
circle could contain and regulate international conflict.
Nevertheless, Boyle concedes that inconsistencies were rife within this
vision of international politics. In particular, American military intervention in
Latin America and East Asia undercut the legitimacy of American
international lawyers to proffer a coherent legal vision. Frequently, the
persons advocating the peaceful resolution of disputes through arbitration also
were, at the same time, in the forefront of rejecting those policies in Latin
America. Boyle cites as an example the American rejection of arbitration over
the issue of the Panama Canal by Theodore Roosevelt's administration.
American policy in Latin America was governed more by the Monroe
Doctrine, which declared an American sphere of influence in the region, than
by the notions of world order that its representatives may have articulated in
the Hague.
Foundations of World Order provides a good summary and explanation
of early American attempts to fashion a modem international legal order.
Throughout the book, Boyle insightfully shows the reader how ideas that were
generated in this period, 1898-1922, were eventually picked up again and
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reshaped in the post-1945 era, when American foreign policy specialists
returned to the question of setting up a system for regulating international
conflict. However, the book, while historical in tone and style, tends to be
episodic and case-study driven. This, at times, weakens the flow and
continuity of the narrative. On substantive matters, although Boyle provides
clear and concise discussion of the relevant international agreements and their
technical legal machinery, readers may desire more background and analysis
on how this generation of lawyers, through their writings and actions,
struggled with the competing concepts of "power" and "law." Nevertheless,
Foundations of World Order is a helpful addition to this continuing dialogue
between international law and politics.
United Nations
The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The
Delegation by the UN Security Council of Its Chapter VII Powers. By
Danesh Sarooshi. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999. Pp. xxii, 311. Price
$105.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Paul Rohrer.
Danesh Sarooshi's The United Nations and the Development of
Collective Security enters the legal and political landscape at a time of
increased international reliance on the U.N. Security Council's Chapter VII
powers. The use of these powers is not only fast expanding; it is
concomitantly altering to include new international and regional entities
operating semi-independently within the U.N.-authorized collective security
rubric. An obvious example of this trend is the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) action in Kosovo. This action postdates even
Sarooshi's very recent publication and highlights the salience of his subject.
As the use of U.N. collective security measures expands in scope and context
beyond the bounds of previously established action, an understanding of the
legal underpinnings is necessary to assure the very legitimization that this use
presupposes. The example of Kosovo is informative, as the action was
controversial and closely linked to the goals of NATO.
A revised and updated doctoral thesis, The United Nations and the
Development of Collective Security meticulously and successfully describes
the mechanisms by which the Security Council may legally delegate its
security powers to other entities acting on its behalf. This descriptive task
takes up the first four chapters of his six-chapter work. In the final two
chapters, Sarooshi attempts to fit recent security actions within his self-
explicated legal matrix.
Sarooshi begins by noting that the Security Council was given the
"primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security" by Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (p. 3). He defines the Security
Council's powers as "the sole authority to determine when a threat to, or
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breach of, the peace has occurred; the authority to order provisional measures;
and the authority to order enforcement measures to be taken against a State"
(p. 3). This authority, according to Sarooshi, is delegable to "other UN
principle organs. However, in practice the Council has mostly delegated such
powers to the UN Secretary-General" (p. 50). The power to delegate is not
specifically included in the U.N. Charter, but Sarooshi makes clear in Chapter
Two that it can be extrapolated from the Charter and surrounding documents.
In turn, Chapter Three deals with how the Secretary-General may
delegate some of these powers to U.N. subsidiary organs as long as those
powers remain under the supervision and control of the delegating principle
organ. This is where the mechanism of delegation becomes more
controversial. Because the United Nations does not maintain its own security
forces, it must delegate some military enforcement duties to member states or
regional alliances. This creates a command-and-control conflict as member
states perform military operations under the general control of the Secretary-
General but under the specific command structure of the member states.
Certain command functions, though, are exclusively reserved for the Security
Council and its representative, the Secretary-General. In the second half of the
book, Sarooshi addresses the resulting problems, including the potential of
extralegal deployments.
Sarooshi breaks down the use of delegated collective security powers by
member states and regional security alliances, by mission objectives, and by
actual geopolitical events. He states that, although in the first few instances of
delegated use of collective force such delegation was seen as an anomaly, it is
now known as the rule.
Sarooshi enumerates the circumstances under which the delegation of
Chapter VII powers has become common:
The Council has delegated its Chapter VII powers to Member States for the attainment of
the following five objectives: to counter a use of force by a State or entities within a
State; to carry out a naval interdiction; to achieve humanitarian objectives; to enforce a
Council declared no-fly zone; and to ensure implementation by parties of an agreement
which the Council has deemed is necessary for the maintenance or restoration of peace.
(p. 167).
Once he has delineated the types of forceful interventions that member states
may undertake under the mandate of the Secretary-General, Sarooshi gives
examples of each. Sarooshi effectively explicates the basic legality of these
actions, though he also suggests that some authorized member states have
engaged in extra-legal excesses.
In the end, Sarooshi's accomplishment is to have meticulously graphed
the legal basis for collective security action by U.N.-authorized member states
(acting alone or in self-selected groupings) on to the geopolitical map of the
modem era. The text shows the ultimate legality of these collective security
actions while beginning to expose their legal limits and practical
complications. As a strictly legal treatise, Sarooshi's text will disappoint those
more interested in tracing the historic development of collective security than
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in establishing formal legality. However, Sarooshi should be congratulated for
his strong scholarship and research. This text will be greatly appreciated by
scholars and practitioners working within the legal rubric of collective
security action authorized by the U.N. Security Council.
Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent.
By Johannes Morsink. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1999. Pp. xiv, 378. Price: $49.95 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Eric
A. Friedman.
The reader of Johannes Morsink's The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent may well come to view article 26 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a microcosm of the whole thirty-
article Declaration that the United Nations General Assembly adopted on
December 10, 1948. This article is more than a simple statement of the right to
education. Its second paragraph in particular captures several central themes
of Morsink's book, including the very purpose of the Declaration and the
degree to which the Declaration was a reaction to the horrors of Nazi
Germany. The second paragraph of article 26 states: "Education shall be
directed to the full development of the human personality and to the
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall
promote understanding, tolerance and friendship . . . and shall further the
activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace" (p. 335).
Morsink, a professor of political philosophy at Drew University, gives
an excellent general overview of the seven-stage, two-year drafting process of
the Declaration. But it is the second chapter--delineating the influence of
World War II on the Declaration-and the final chapter, which deals with the
fundamental purpose of the Declaration, that merit special note. These two
features of the Declaration-its reaction to the horrors of the Holocaust and its
global purpose-form the bookends within which Morsink explores the
various sections of the Declaration. In the five chapters in between, the author
takes the reader on a thematic tour of the various provisions of the
Declaration. He focuses on the strong nondiscrimination aspect of the
Declaration, the right to privacy, and the heavy influence of the Latin
American socialist countries that pushed hard for the inclusion of right-to-
work provisions in the Declaration.
In the second chapter, Morsink demonstrates how the influence of World
War II and the Holocaust is embedded in most of the articles in the
Declaration. For instance, the drafters understood that it was not enough for
them to declare that education is a right and is compulsory, two of the key
elements of article 26(1). There was, after all, compulsory education in Nazi
Germany. Yet to say that Nazi Germany had provided its people the human
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right to education would be absurd because education often took the form of
brainwashing people in theories of inequality and hatred. Hence the inclusion
of the language of human rights, peace, and tolerance as the purpose of
education. That article 5 of the Declaration goes beyond forbidding torture to
also forbid "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" (p. 42) is
also a response to the Holocaust, specifically the horrendous pseudo-scientific
experiments that the Nazis conducted on death camp prisoners. And still,
some U.N. members felt that the Declaration did not go far enough in
addressing the evil of the Axis Powers; the United Nations' six Communist
countries abstained in the General Assembly vote on the Declaration (the
Declaration passed 48-0-8) because they could not give their full support to a
document that did not explicitly condemn Nazism and fascism.
Throughout the book, Morsink discusses how the drafters made a very
conscious effort to keep abstract principles distinct from the implementation
language that would come in a binding human rights covenant. (Such a
covenant would eventually take the form of the International Covenants for
Civil and Political Rights and for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.)
Therefore, rather than stating within the Declaration that its purpose was to
serve as a standard for legislation, a very plausible option, the Declaration
declares "that every individual and every organ of society.., shall strive by
teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms" (p.
330). Because of this emphasis, the drafters were quite mindful that the
Declaration should be accessible to the common person, and consequently
they sought to make the document clear and concise.
According to Morsink, the rights to food, clothing, housing, and medical
care were included in the early drafts of the Declaration largely because of the
Latin American influence. And one learns that these rights would likely have
been cut out of the final draft-near-victims of the delegates' zeal for
brevity-were it not for the weight of the Soviet and Chinese delegations.
Morsink is also keenly aware of those provisions that did not make it into the
Declaration; the penultimate chapter examines a special minority rights article
that failed to be included into the Declaration's final version. The eighth and
final chapter, which discusses the Preamble and Article 1 of the Declaration,
as well as the purpose of the Declaration, brings education back to the
forefront.
Morsink succeeds in integrating into his analysis of the Declaration both
its words and phrases and its all-embracing principles of universality and the
unity of all human rights. The book's analysis of one of humanity's most
noble statements is admirably thorough, though in one case-its examination
of the right to property-perhaps tediously so. As much of the book is about
how the particular articles came to be drafted, the reader gains a deeper
understanding of how the drafters intended the various rights to be
understood.
From our more jaded contemporary perspective, it is exhilarating to take
an inside look at the process whereby delegates of nations around the globe
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came together with tremendous idealism, and no lack of chutzpah, to dare to
draft a Declaration of Human Rights that they termed Universal. Morsink
shows how the Declaration's message emerged out of intense negotiations at a
distinct period of history between individuals of different nations, worldviews,
and alliances. This Universal Declaration set into motion a human rights
movement that has brought some of humankind's most cherished ideals nearer
to reality. And yet, to borrow from the Preamble, "the advent of a world in
which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom
from fear and want[,] .. the highest aspiration of the common people," (p.
329) remains a distant star for which we must continue to reach.
War Crimes: The Legacy of Nuremberg. Edited by Belinda Cooper. New
York: TV Books, 1999. Pp. 350. Price: $29.95 (Hardcover). Reviewed
by Youngjin Jung.
The Rome Conference held in June 1998 was a landmark event in the
development of international human rights. It laid the foundation for
establishing a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) and constituted a
major step forward in the movement to create truly international mechanisms
for punishing human rights abusers. With the implementation of the ICC, the
protection of individual human dignity will no longer be left solely in the
hands of sovereign states. This change in paradigm has deep roots in another
historic event with a legacy crucial to the contemporary history of human
rights, namely the creation of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal
after World War II.
Against this backdrop, War Crimes: The Legacy of Nuremberg was
released in conjunction with a 1996 Court TV documentary commemorating
the fiftieth anniversary of the groundbreaking adjudicative body. What
distinguishes this book from others on the subject is that it features the
opinions of a broad spectrum of professionals, not only of lawyers, but also of
historians, journalists, and policy experts. These various perspectives help us
understand why world public opinion has come to accept the fairness and
legitimacy of the Nuremberg Tribunal even in the face of well-documented
procedural and theoretical defects. The collected essays-edited by Belinda
Cooper-also show us that the phenomenon of international law cannot be
understood in isolation from its historical background and context.
The book is composed of three parts which cover in sequence the past,
present and future of the idea of an international criminal court. Part I
addresses the Nuremberg Tribunal itself, its achievements and its weaknesses.
The authors generally reiterate the conventional wisdom on the Nuremberg
Tribunal. On the positive side, Nuremberg introduced the revolutionary legal
principle that following orders was not a defense, and it changed the focus of
international accountability from sovereign states to individuals. On the other
hand, Nuremberg clearly smacked of victors' justice: "The accused came only
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from the ranks of the defeated; .. .the judges came only from the victors'
side" (p. 295), and the common law system was applied unilaterally.
Most of the writers line up where one would expect. Bernard Meltzer
and Benjamin Ferencz, two of the American prosecutors at Nuremberg,
describe the trials as fair and just given the circumstances of the time. On the
other hand, J6rg Friedrich, a German historian and journalist, argues that,
while "on paper and in theory the Nuremberg Tribunal appeared to be a
pioneering use of international justice; in fact, ... it was an instrument of a
successor regime that had taken power in a revolutionary coup in the form of a
world war" (p. 90).
More intriguing comments on Nuremberg come from law professors
Ruti Teitel and Edward M. Wise and American historian Peter Maguire. In
assessing the ultimate influence of Nuremberg, Teitel argues that
the Nuremberg paradigm created fundamental alterations in our view of the rule of law as
accountability; in the reconceptualization and shift of responsibility from the collective to
the individual; in the reconceptualization of jurisdiction, from national to international;
and finally, in the reconceptualization of humanitarian law violations pertaining to the
law of armed conflict to include persecution even in times of peace (p. 53).
Wise notes that the history of war crimes dates back to even before the Hague
Convention of 1899. Consequently, he concludes that it was the concepts of
crimes against peace and crimes against humanity-as defined in articles 6(a)
and 6(c) of the Tribunal's Charter respectively-that constituted the true
innovation of Nuremberg. Still from another perspective, Maguire's
fascinating article describes how public outrage over war crimes quickly
yielded to the political exigencies of the Cold War.
Part II focuses on the Tribunal's legacy today as the international
community confronts ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity. The
first section of this part deals mainly with the background, contexts, and
ongoing adjudications of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). These courts were established in
1993 and 1994 by the United Nations Security Council in accordance with its
U.N. Charter Chapter VII powers.
William W. Home, former editor of The American Lawyer, traces the
ICTY's development and details the trial of one of its most notorious
defendants, Dusko Tadic. Law professor Diane F. Orentlicher argues that the
ruling rendered by the Appeals Chamber of ICTY in the Tadic case is one of
the most important since Nuremberg because it extended humanitarian
protection to those caught in the crossfire of internal (i.e., domestic or "civil")
armed conflicts. Patricia Viseur Sellers, legal advisor to the prosecutor of
gender-related crimes at the ICTY, thoroughly traces international law related
to rape, including the issue of so-called comfort women. Whereas the
Nuremberg Tribunal regarded rape neither as a war crime nor as a crime
against humanity, it is today recognized as both in international instruments
such as the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICC.
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The second section of this part considers possible alternatives to
tribunals and supplementary methods of addressing massive human rights
violations. American legal scholars Neil J. Kritz and Madeline H. Morris both
argue that prosecution of war crimes before domestic courts can perform some
important functions apart from those served in international courts. Morris
touches upon the tricky issue of complementarity (or concurrent jurisdiction)
between international and national courts and argues that international
tribunals should not be assumed to be superior to national courts. Timothy
Phillips and Mary Albon, both of the Project on Justice in Times of
Transition, emphasize the importance of alternatives to prosecution, such as
truth commissions, in situations where prosecutions may not be possible or
desirable. Lastly, Beth Stephens and Jennifer Green discuss the American
civil suit filed against the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. The right to
file such a lawsuit against de facto regimes was upheld by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the authors-both of whom acted as
attorneys for the plaintiffs in the Karadzic case-conclude that "civil litigation
in domestic courts can play an important role in the struggle to protect human
rights" (p. 269).
Part ifI of War Crimes, which focuses on the future of international
tribunals, reflects the general feeling that the permanent International Criminal
Court represents the culmination of a process begun at Nuremberg. Donna K.
Axel of the New School for Social Research describes the process leading up
to the historic 1998 conference in Rome, and the Epilogue expounds major
contents of the Statute of the ICC adopted in that conference.
This book carries a diverse array of perspectives on the legacy of
Nuremberg and shows in detail the efforts, intentions, and accomplishments of
the international community to criminalize and punish perpetrators of human
rights violations. However, the editor also seems to place too much emphasis
upon the bright side of the institutionalization of the ICC and does not convey
its limitations. For instance, the editor's Epilogue simply criticizes the United
States for not signing on to the ICC but does not elaborate on some legitimate
criticisms of the ICC-for example, its claim to jurisdiction (in some
instances) over nationals of non-member states.
All in all, this book is very informative. It is an indispensable guide for
readers who are interested in tracing the legacy of the Nuremberg Tribunal
and subsequent historical developments in international human rights.
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Religious Fundamentalisms and the Human Rights of Women. Edited by
Courtney W. Howland. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. Pp. xxv,
326. Price $45.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Jana King.
In Religious Fundamentalisms and the Human Rights of Women,
Courtney Howland, a visiting scholar at the International Women's Rights
Center at Georgetown University Law Center, addresses the challenges
religious fundamentalist movements pose for women's rights and equality.
Although the editor brings together authors from various religions, academic
disciplines (including anthropology, law, theology, and education), and
geographic regions, these authors share the view of religious fundamentalism
as a worldwide movement tied to legal issues and international human rights.
While fundamentalism takes different forms within Christianity, Islam,
Hinduism, Judaism, and Buddhism, all of these fundamentalist movements are
detrimental to women's rights by upholding gender roles that enforce the
subordination of women. The fundamentalist movements that the authors
highlight range from minority movements within a country to fundamentalist
national governments. Law and legal rights are key issues in these
movements, which attempt to build law upon religious doctrine.
The authors of the book focus on three main themes: women's sexuality,
legal and nonlegal remedies, and the collusion of the West with
fundamentalism. Viewing women's sexuality as a threat to society, religious
fundamentalists seek to control reproduction and sexuality. They promote a
patriarchal view of the family that confines women's roles to wife and mother
and limits their involvement in the public sphere. Seeking strategies of
resistance to religious fundamentalists, the authors propose legal solutions at
the international and national levels, as well as nonlegal approaches. Finally,
the authors challenge the .West in its implicit and explicit collusion with
religious fundamentalism. They claim that, in an effort to promote
multiculturalism and respect for other cultures, many people in the West
choose not to condemn religious fundamentalism's violations of women's
human rights.
These three themes recur throughout the book, which is divided into
seven sections. The sections contain three to four short essays. Each essay is
approximately ten pages. The first section employs a social and political
science analysis to address the impact of religious fundamentalism on women.
John Hawley puts forward the definition of fundamentalism foundational to
the book. Although there are difficulties in using this term-it is pejorative
and associated with its American Protestant origins-Hawley argues that no
term is fully adequate for comparative purposes among groups. He chooses to
use the word "fundamentalism," contending that it upholds the ideas of many
"militantly conservative religious groups" (p. 7). These groups, regardless of
ethnicity, religion, or nationality all seek to restore core values (fundamentals)
that are divinely sanctioned and overridden by modernity. One of their major
concerns is to place and keep women in a position subordinate to men. The
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remaining three essays in this section provide sociological and political
descriptions of fundamentalism in the three major monotheistic religions:
Christianity, Islam, and Judaism.
Cultural relativism, the focus of the second section, poses a unique
problem for women's rights. Contending that there are no universal standards
by which cultures may be evaluated and compared, cultural relativist
arguments often accept religious fundamentalists' treatment of women. The
essays in this section explore the claims of cultural relativism, its nexus with
international law, and fundamentalists' employment of cultural relativist
claims to justify their patriarchal structures in the name of culture and
religion. Finally, asserting that cultural relativism and religious extremism
pose the greatest threat to international human rights, author Radhika
Coomaraswamy proposes three approaches to bridge the gap between cultural
relativism and a universal standard of human rights.
Section Three examines the issues religious fundamentalism and
women's rights raise in the international legal system. The theme underlying
this section is the legality of rules based on religious norms that discriminate
against women. These essays evaluate religious fundamentalist norms of
obedience and modesty in the face of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the politically-motivated, but religion-cloaked,
reservations of Muslim countries entering the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Following an examination of
women's rights to freedom of religion or belief under human rights treaties,
this section concludes with an exploration of girls' rights to education. Many
girls are denied this fundamental human right, due to socioeconomic, cultural,
and religious factors. Authors Geraldine Van Bueren and Deirdre Fottrell
examine the power of international law to prohibit this discrimination.
The fourth section focuses on the national level, addressing the issues
raised in this context by religious fundamentalism and its treatment of women.
One of the major debates at the national level is which laws should be
applicable to religious and secular groups within the same country. The
authors highlight this debate through their analyses of India's Hindu Right,
religion and patriarchal politics in Israel, and the conflict between European
family laws and immigrants' male-biased foreign laws.
Women's sexuality and reproduction is the theme of Section Five.
Religious fundamentalists generally desire to control women's sexuality
because they view it as a threat to society. The authors in this section explore
the effects of fundamentalism on women's sexuality and reproductive health
and discuss how fundamentalists hinder women's autonomy by preserving the
power of men and controlling women. In addition, fundamentalist scholars
interpret women's sexuality as the key factor determining women's rights and
duties. Women are viewed as lustful creatures who obstruct the duty of men.
Although such views are not limited to one religion, in the case of Thai
Buddhism this conception underlies prostitution. The authors propose
alternatives to traditional interpretations of women's sexuality and criticize
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the international human rights discourse for failing to address the role of
culture and religion in depriving women of their rights.
Section Six examines how women resist fundamentalism. The authors in
this section are not academicians, but rather work directly in the trenches
fighting for women's rights. They utilize their experiences to discuss current
effective modes of resistance and suggest alternative methods. Education has
been an especially important battleground in this arena. Sakena Yacoobi
discusses the efforts of Afghan women to educate other Afghan women and
girls in the Diaspora through the Afghan Institute of Learning, founded by
Yacoobi and colleagues in 1995. Cecile Richards examines the Religious
Right in the United States. She discusses the Texas Freedom Network-a non-
partisan grassroots organization founded to provide an alternative to the
Religious Right-and demonstrates how one can counterbalance the activities
of fundamentalism. Paul Nejeski, a United States Immigration Judge explores
the extent to which women seeking freedom from religious fundamentalism
can find refuge in the United States. He states that asylum based on violence
from religious fundamentalism has been granted to some individuals. Finally,
Azar Nafisi examines the ways in which women challenge fundamentalism in
the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The last section of the book explores challenges to religious
fundamentalism made by religious interpretation. The authors in this section
either provide their own or lay forth others' alternative interpretations to
fundamentalism. Their essays propose theological alternatives to religious
fundamentalism in Judaism, Buddhism, Catholicism, and Islam. The authors
recognize that efforts to enhance the status and rights of women must not
neglect religion in their task because this would alienate those for whom
religion is a vital part of life.
The goal of Religious Fundamentalisms and the Human Rights of
Women is to address the challenges religious fundamentalist movements pose
for women's rights. This goal is accomplished in the book's thoughtfully
organized presentation of a rich variety of topics and themes and through its
incorporation of writers from a wide range of backgrounds, religions, and
experiences. The pieces must unfortunately be kept short to present this
variety. Section Six is particularly noteworthy as it contains the essays of
people working directly in the field for women's rights, adding a fresh
counterbalance to the other more academic chapters. Although a few other
essays offer solutions to the problems they pose, most fail to be prescriptive.
Still, the editor should be applauded for collecting an impressive array of
essays that probe the interconnections of religious fundamentalism, law, and
the human rights of women.
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Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline and the Law of War. By Mark
J. Osiel. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999. Pp. viii,
398. Price $34.95 (Hardcover). By Jeannette A. Vargas.
Perhaps the topic du jour in international law circles has been the
question of how to deal with those individuals responsible for the commission
of war crimes and atrocities. Efforts to address this issue have proceeded on
the international stage, with the adoption of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, in transnational forums, with the push to
extradite Chilean Senator Augusto Pinochet to Spain, and in the domestic
arena, with the trials of members of the Argentine junta involved in that
country's dirty war. Yet even with the flurry of activity in this field over the
last decade, few recent scholarly works have considered these questions with
the sophistication and even-handedness of Mark J. Osiel's latest contribution
to the ongoing debate.
In Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline and the Law of War,
Osiel, a law professor at the University of Iowa, tackles the troubling question
of who should be held criminally liable for war crimes and under what
circumstances. This book functions on many levels, as a work of applied
ethics, legal theory, and military strategy. The nominal focus of this inquiry is
the superior order's defense, which immunizes soldiers from liability when
their criminal actions are taken pursuant to a command from a superior. Yet in
the course of his examination of this problematic feature of military and
international law, Osiel also offers an in-depth analysis of the causes of
atrocities, the psychology of soldiers, and the institutional design of the
modem military.
The argument begins with a critique of current legal doctrine in the area
of the superior order's defense. The sole exception to this defense is the
manifest illegality rule-a subordinate must resolve all doubts about the
legality of an order by presuming its legitimacy, unless the order is prima
facie illegal. This narrow exception applies only to a few of the gravest of
crimes, with no consideration of the particular circumstances faced by the
soldier, such as the opportunity to consult legal counsel or to get clarification
of the orders. Traditionally, this rule has been premised on an argument
stressing military necessity:
It is designed entirely in anticipation of a single, worst-case situation which has become
increasingly rare due to the changes in the nature of modern war. In this situation, an ill-
informed subordinate must instantly obey his superior's orders to use deadly force
without a moment's reflection, or else all (i.e. the decisive battle) will be lost (p. 157).
Yet Osiel convincingly refutes this notion of the paradigmatic military
encounter. Through a socio-historical review of military engagements, this
book argues that the modem military no longer values unthinking
subordinates and centralized command. Rather, situational judgment and
initiative among the lower ranks are highly valued as part of an effective
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military force. The antiquated approach of the superior order's defense does
not recognize the realities of combat, and thus is a danger both to the redesign
of a more efficient military and to humanitarian goals.
This book argues for a reform of the doctrine, for a greater reliance on
general standards rather than bright-line rules. According to this premise,
imposing criminal liability on soldiers who have followed orders that they
should have reasonably known were illegal would simultaneously decrease
the occurrence of atrocities while encouraging the type of independent and
critical judgment that leads to operational success. One obvious side effect of
such a change would be to allow a greater number of soldiers to be found
guilty of war crimes. Yet the real benefits would come at a deeper level of
deterrence than mere penal sanctions. Osiel's ambitious thesis is that a
reliance on general standards would foster the incorporation of ethics into the
nomos of the military profession. Professional soldiers would be trained to
think of moral consequences, their humanitarian instincts as much a part of
their identity as martial honor and other military virtues.
With a multi-disciplinary approach, this book ably argues from the
perspectives of the soldier, the prosecutor, the military commander, and the
human rights activist. The author avoids the tendency that has cropped up in
too many recent works in this area to demonize one side of the debate. Rather,
Osiel proceeds from the assumption that military and humanitarian objectives
are not inherently in tension, that they can be simultaneously pursued once a
common ground has been established. Indeed, it would not be too much of an
exaggeration to say that, with his optimistic vision of the ethical soldier, Osiel
envisions that the military can be the heroes of the story-the common
infantryman as human rights activist.
With such a breadth of scope, it is almost inevitable that some micro-
level flaws should emerge. For example, the deliberate creation of the military
culture proposed here presupposes a fairly organized military structure with
rigorous training and indoctrination. Yet in many parts of the world, including
some areas where the problem of responsibility for atrocities has been most
keenly felt, these preconditions are not in place. This objection is brusquely
dealt with in the book, as it is suggested that international law should maintain
the manifest illegality rule as a floor, since less educated soldiers should be
regulated by strict rules rather than standards. Thus, although the argument
draws upon examples of war crimes and military structures from various
nations and time periods, the proposed solution is limited in its applicability.
Despite this caveat, Obeying Orders is a lively read, with much to
recommend it. The author draws upon a wealth of knowledge, both empirical
and theoretical, to make a cogent and nuanced argument. Through a welcome
focus on the ex ante effects of legal rules on the military culture, he straddles
the line between pure legal formalism and political science realism. Osiel has
written a tract that is of equal concern to philosophers, international lawyers,
human rights activists, and military personnel.
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